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Abstract 
We report two experiments exploring the perception of how contemporary philosophy is 
often conducted. We find that (1) participants associate philosophy with the practice of 
conducting thought experiments and collating intuitions about them, and (2) that this 
form of inquiry is viewed much less favourably than the typical form of inquiry in 
psychology: research conducted by teams using controlled experiments and observation. 
We also found (3) an effect whereby relying on intuition is viewed more favorably in the 
context of team inquiry than in individual inquiry and (4) that greater prior exposure to 
philosophy lowered one’s opinion of inquiry driven by intuitions and thought 
experiments. Finally with respect to participant gender, we found that (5) women favored 
observation over intuition more than men did, and (6) tended to view a question pursued 
by a research team as more important than men viewed it. 
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Perceived Weaknesses of Philosophical Inquiry: A Comparison to Psychology 
A philosophical proposition must not deal specially with things on the 
surface of the earth, or with the solar system, or with any other portion of 
space of time. A philosophical proposition must be such as can be neither 
proved nor disproved by empirical evidence. Too often we find in 
philosophical books arguments based upon the course of history, or the 
convolutions of the brain, or the eyes of shell-fish. Special and accidental 
facts of this kind are irrelevant to philosophy. 
–– Bertrand Russell, Mysticism and Logic 
 
1 Introduction 
Philosophy and psychology are closely related disciplines. Yet while philosophers and 
psychologists often investigate similar sorts of questions, they do so by using very 
different methodologies. To help illustrate this point, compare the traditional methods 
typically used by philosophers to the traditional methods found in experimental 
psychology with respect to the same question. For instance, consider one question that 
has overlapped both fields: do humans have free will (Baumeister 2008, Baumeister et al. 
2009, Dennett 1984, Libet 1985, Nietzsche 1989, 1999, Pronin et al. 2006, Spinoza 1992 
[1677], van Inwagen 1983)? In an attempt to harness the power of pure thought, the 
philosopher might answer this question by turning to deep reflection on the concept and 
nature of free will. To aid in his analysis he might construct a series of thought 
experiments or imaginary scenarios where a person makes a series of decisions, and then 
use his intuitions about these cases to help answer the question (see Gendler 2000, 2007). 
Most philosophical research is conducted and published by individuals. And because of 
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the regrettable gender imbalance in philosophy (Paxton, Figdor and Tiberius 2012), the 
process usually ends up involving individual males constructing thought experiments and 
collating their intuitions about them. The stereotypical image of Rodin’s Thinker comes 
to mind. 
No doubt the typical psychologist would approach this question differently. 
Instead of turning to intuition, the psychologist would likely attempt to harness the power 
of controlled observation and experimentation. To aid in her analysis she might construct 
a series of behavioral studies or controlled experiments where a person makes a series of 
decisions, and then use the resulting observations that she collects to help answer the 
question. Most psychological research is conducted and published in collaboration with 
other researchers in a laboratory. And because women are not underrepresented in 
psychology (see the American Psychological Association’s 2005 Doctorate Employment 
Survey), this process frequently involves working in groups where women equal or even 
outnumber men. 
These two approaches represent the typical, albeit simplified, methods commonly 
associated with philosophy and experimental psychology. Each has advantages and 
disadvantages. We will not presently debate the substantive epistemological merits of 
intuition or observation. But we are curious to understand how people perceive the 
relative merits of these two approaches.  
Philosophy is not always perceived as well as philosophers would like. Recent 
years have seen public discussions of whether studying philosophy has any value at all — 
both in higher education or for society as a whole (see Fish 2011, The New York Times: 
“Does Philosophy Matter?” or McIntyre 2011, The Chronicle of Higher Education: 
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“Making Philosophy Matter—or Else” for two recent examples). United States politicians 
and Presidential candidates quip, “We need more welders and less philosophers” (Rubio 
2015). Academic philosophy has long faced complex and troubling questions concerning 
lack of diversity and the underrepresentation of women in the discipline (see Lombrozo 
2013, NPR: “Name Five Women In Philosophy. Bet You Can’t”). Among scholars, the 
renowned physicist Stephen Hawking famously declared, “Philosophy is dead.” And 
discussion of the value of philosophy has even led notable academic philosophers to draft 
anti-philosophy manifestos criticizing the contributions traditional analytic philosophers 
make to the academy (see Glymour 2011: “Manifesto”, and Thagard 2012: “Eleven 
Dogmas of Analytic Philosophy”). 
What contributes to negative opinions about philosophy? There are certain to be a 
number of diverse contributing factors. Our question is about one such potential factor. 
Are negative opinions about philosophy partly due to the fact that people are suspicious 
of the way philosophers conduct their research? To help answer this question, it would be 
useful to examine how people evaluate typical philosophical inquiry compared to how 
they evaluate the typical inquiry of a neighboring field, such as psychology, when used to 
answer similar questions. This is exactly what we set out to investigate in the following 
experiments. 
2 Experiment 1 
One way to test how people evaluate philosophical inquiry compared to how they 
evaluate the typical inquiry of a neighboring field, such as psychology, is to ask people to 
choose between the different approaches associated with these fields. One dimension, 
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mentioned earlier, separating philosophy and psychology is the basic methodological 
tools these researchers typically employed, namely, thought experimentation versus 
controlled experimentation. In this study we present participants with several research 
questions of central interest to both philosophers and psychologists and asked them to 
select the method better suited to provide answers. We find that participants strongly 
prefer the empirical methods they associate with psychology to help answer these 
questions. 
2.1 Method 
2.1.1 Participants 
Participants (N = 420, 161 female, aged 18-66 years, M = 29.6 years, SD = 8.89 years; 
95% reporting English as a native language) were recruited, tested and compensated 
using an online platform (Amazon Mechanical Turk + Qualtrics). They were paid $0.30 
for 2-3 minutes of their time. Participation was limited to those residing in the United 
States. Fifty-four percent had taken no philosophy courses, 29% had taken one, 10% had 
taken two, and 7% had taken three or more. Twenty-four percent had taken no science 
courses, 16% had taken one, 19% had taken two, and 41% had taken three or more. 
2.1.2 Materials and procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of seven conditions in a between-subjects 
experiment. Each participant read a single story. The stories all featured a university 
student interested in studying a certain research question. The stories differed by the 
particular question the student was interested in researching. The research questions that 
were featured involved whether: 
• human beings have free will 
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• babies are born with a sense of fairness 
• robots can ever be conscious 
• some moral rules are relative to culture 
• capitalism is morally superior to socialism 
• it's possible to knowledgeably predict the future 
• original artworks are inherently more beautiful than replicas 
After reading the story, participants were asked to select the approach more likely to help 
the student answer this research question. They could select one of the following 
dichotomous response options: 
1. Conduct thought experiments and gather intuitions about them. 
2. Conduct controlled experiments and make observations about them. 
Response options were rotated randomly. Upon selecting a dichotomous response option, 
participants were asked to rate how confident they were in their answer. These responses 
were collected on a six-item scale, where “1” was anchored with “not at all confident” 
and “6” was anchored with “completely confident.” 
After reporting their confidence participants were taken to a new screen and could 
not go back and change their answers. On this new screen participants were presented 
with a sorting task. They were again presented with the text of the dichotomous response 
options in 1 and 2 above and asked to associate these with the discipline they better 
matched, philosophy or psychology.  
After testing, participants were taken to a new screen where they completed a short 
demographic questionnaire. 
2.2 Results 
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First, we found that assignment to condition did not affect which method participants 
thought was better suited to answer the research question, χ2(6, 420) = 8.68, p = .193. 
Overall, 76% of participants selected controlled experimentation as the better method, 
which far exceeds what could be expected by chance, χ2(1, 420) = 117.34, p < .001. The 
percentage of participants that selected controlled experimentation for each question 
ranged from 67% to 85% and, in each case, significantly exceeded chance rates, binomial 
tests, all ps ≤ .008. (See Fig. 1). An analysis of variance revealed that there was no effect 
of condition on participants’ reported confidence in their judgment, F(6, 406) = 1.53, p = 
.168, n.s. However, participant response to the question did affect reported confidence, 
with those selecting thought experimentation being less confident (M = 3.79, SD = 1.32) 
than those selecting controlled experimentation (M = 4.61, SD = 1.12), F(1, 406) = 36.28, 
p < .001. Follow-up independent samples t-test revealed that the magnitude of the 
difference in means was large, t(144) = -5.61, MD = -0.82, 95% CI for MD = -1.1 to -
0.56,  Cohen’s d = 0.94. 
Second, we also found that participants overwhelmingly associated thought 
experimentation and intuition with philosophy and controlled experimentation and 
observation with psychology  (335, 80%), χ2(1, 420) = 148.8, p < .001. 
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Fig. 1: Experiment 1. Percentage of participants that selected controlled experimentation 
for each research question. 
 
2.3 Discussion 
The results show that participants clearly prefer the methods they associated with 
psychology to those they associated with philosophy. Participants overwhelming selected 
controlled experimentation and observation over thought experimentation and intuition. 
Moreover, participants who chose controlled experimentation were significantly more 
confident in their choice than participants who chose thought experimentation.  
While this is certainly revealing, the study itself had some limitations. First, the 
methodological approaches were minimally described. Perhaps a more thorough 
description of the methodologies in action will produce a more favorable comparative 
assessment of philosophical method. Second, when asked to choose directly between the 
methodologies, participants preferred the psychological method. But perhaps participants 
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will rate philosophical methods equally highly when each is considered on its own. In 
other words, perhaps a between-subjects evaluation of the methodologies will yield a 
different result than a within-subjects comparison. Although we think that a within-
subjects comparison is actually more informative, we do agree that a between-subjects 
comparison is also worthwhile. Third, we used only one measure to collect preferences. 
But it could be informative to use a variety of measures to gauge preferences. The next 
experiment addresses all three of these points. 
3 Experiment 2 
We ran another experiment to address the three concerns raised about Experiment 1 and 
to replicate the main findings using a very different experimental design. The new 
experimental design features cases with more thorough descriptions of the philosophical 
and psychological methodologies being employed by researchers. We also investigate 
two additional methodological differences, mentioned earlier, separating typical inquiry 
in philosophy and psychology, namely, the number of researchers involved in a research 
project, and the gender composition of those researchers. In this study we treat these 
differences as independent variables to be manipulated. We also collect a wider range of 
judgments about the value, responsibility, importance, and interest of the research 
methodologies employed. 
 
3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Participants 
Participants (N = 1675, 679 female, aged 18-82 years, M = 30.2 years, SD = 10.5 years; 
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94% reporting English as a native language) were recruited, tested and compensated 
using an online platform (Amazon Mechanical Turk + Qualtrics). They were paid $0.30 
for 2-3 minutes of their time. Participation was limited to those residing in the United 
States. Forty-seven percent had taken no philosophy courses, 34% had taken one, 12% 
had taken two, and 7% had taken three or more. Thirteen percent had taken no science 
courses, 10% had taken one, 15% had taken two, and 62% had taken three or more. 
3.1.2 Materials and procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of sixteen conditions in a 2 (Number: 
Individual/Team) x 2 (Composition: Male/Female) x 2 (Method: Intuition/Observation) x 
2 (Question: Selfishness/Knowledge) between-subjects experiment. Each participant read 
a single story about one or more researchers conducting inquiry. 
The Number, Composition, and Method factors manipulated the story’s content 
according to the details outlined in the Introduction: the number of researchers involved, 
the gender of the researchers, and the method used to answer a research question. We 
included the Question factor in order to guard against results being driven by superficial 
features of, or presuppositions about, the research question under consideration. Each 
question is the topic of research in both philosophy and psychology. 
All the stories are included in the Appendix. Here we include two of them to give 
readers a sense of the materials. The first is a case where a solitary male researcher relies 
on thought experimentation and intuition to answer a research question about human 
selfishness. The second is a case where a team of female researchers rely on controlled 
experimentation and observation to answer a research question about human knowledge. 
Individual Male Intuition (Selfish). Fred has always wondered whether humans 
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are naturally selfish. In order to help answer this question, Fred constructs a series 
of thought experiments (imaginary scenarios) where a person must decide 
between doing something selfish or cooperative. For each scenario, Fred has a 
clear intuition about what the agent would choose. Fred then considers which 
hypothesis — (i) that people are naturally selfish, or (ii) that people are not 
naturally selfish — best fits with his own intuitions about these cases. Based on 
this procedure that harnesses the power of pure thought, Fred concludes that 
people are naturally selfish. 
Team Female Observation (Knowledge). Mary, Sally and Jill have always 
wondered whether innate knowledge of grammar is required for humans to learn a 
language. In order to help answer this question, Mary, Sally and Jill construct a 
series of controlled experiments (behavioral studies) where a person learns to use 
language. For each scenario, Mary, Sally and Jill gather clear data about whether 
innate knowledge of grammar was also present. Mary, Sally and Jill then consider 
which hypothesis — (i) that innate knowledge is required, or (ii) that innate 
knowledge is not required — best fits with the team’s observations about these 
cases. Based on this procedure that harnesses the power of controlled 
experimentation, Mary, Sally and Jill conclude that innate knowledge is required 
to learn a language. 
After reading the story, participants answered six questions. All six questions 
appeared on a single screen underneath the story. All the questions are included in the 
Appendix. Participants who read the Individual Male Intuition (Selfish) case were asked 
to respond to six items: 
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1. Fred is correct that people are naturally selfish. 
2. The question Fred is investigating has important implications for everyday life. 
3. The methodology used by Fred is valuable. 
4. The methodology used by Fred is responsible. 
5. The methodology used by Fred is well suited to answering important questions. 
6. Would you be interested in using Fred’s methodology to answer questions that 
you care about? 
Participants who read the Team Female Observation (Knowledge) case were asked to rate 
these six statements: 
1. Mary, Sally and Jill are correct that learning a language requires innate 
knowledge. 
2. The question Mary, Sally and Jill are investigating has important implications for 
everyday life. 
3. The methodology used by Mary, Sally and Jill is valuable. 
4. The methodology used by Mary, Sally and Jill is responsible. 
5. The methodology used by Mary, Sally and Jill is well suited to answering 
important questions. 
6. Would you be interested in using Mary, Sally and Jill’s methodology to answer 
questions that you care about? 
Responses to items 1-5 were collected on a standard 9-point Likert scale. The 
response options were anchored with “Strongly disagree,” “Disagree,” “Neutral,” 
“Agree,” and “Strongly agree,” left-to-right on the participant’s screen. Responses to item 
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6 were similarly collected, except that the anchors were “Definitely no,” “No,” “Neutral,” 
“Yes,” and “Definitely yes.” 
After testing, participants were taken to a new screen where they completed a 
short demographic questionnaire. 
3.2 Results 
For the purposes of analyzing the results, we constructed a Methodology Evaluation 
Scale (MES) based on the four probes, 3–6, about the methodology being used. 
Responses to these items were highly internally consistent (Cronbach’s α = .918), 
strongly suggesting that they measure the same underlying construct. For each 
participant, their MES score was the mean of the values of their response to the four 
items. The value for each response could range from 1 (“Strongly disagree”/“Definitely 
yes”) to 9 (“Strongly agree”/“Definitely no”). 
Using the MES score as our dependent variable, and controlling for the influence 
of participants’ (dis)agreement with the substantive conclusion drawn by the 
researcher(s), we checked for main and two-way interaction effects for the four 
independent variables: Number (Individual/Group), Composition (Male/Female), Method 
(Intuition/Observation), and Question (Selfishness/Knowledge). We found main effects 
for each of these factors. 
For Method, mean MES score was higher for observation than intuition, M = 
5.98/4.97, SD = 1.39/1.84, ANCOVA, F(1, 1658) = 162.2, p <.001, ηp2 = .089. For 
Number, it was higher for teams than for individuals, M = 5.57/5.39, SD = 1.55/1.85, 
ANCOVA, F(1, 1658) = 4.5, p = .034, ηp2 = .003. For Composition, it was higher for 
female than for male, M = 5.54/5.42, SD = 1.66/1.76, ANCOVA, F(1, 1658) = 4.38, p = 
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.036, ηp2 = .003. And for Question, it was higher for human knowledge than for 
selfishness, M = 5.65/5.31, SD = 1.71/1.69,  ANCOVA, F(1, 1658) = 37.63, p < .001, ηp2 
= .022.  
We also found two significant interactions. First, there was an interaction between 
Method and Number whereby MES score for intuitional method was higher in Team 
conditions than Individual conditions, ANCOVA, F(1, 1658) = 13.51, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.008. Reliance on intuition was viewed more positively in the context of team rather than 
individual research, M = 5.21/4.72, SD = 1.66/1.97, independent samples t-test, t (814.84) 
= -3.87, p < .001, MD = .49, whereas reliance on observation was viewed equally 
positively in the context of team and individual research, M = 5.93/6.04, SD = 1.34/1.45, 
independent samples t-test t(838) = 1.2, p = .231, n.s.. Second, we found an interaction 
between Method and participant gender, ANCOVA, F(1, 1658) = 6.6, p = .01, ηp2 = .004, 
with women more highly valuing observation over intuition (M = 6.08/4.85, SD = 
1.36/1.87) than men (M = 5.92/5.05, SD = 1.42/1.81). There was no main effect of 
participant gender and it entered into no other interactions. 
Given how few of our participants had taken at least three philosophy courses 
(7%) compared to how many had taken at least three science courses (62%), one might 
worry that these results are being driven primarily by the comparatively greater prior 
exposure to, and familiarity with, scientific methodology. This might be compounded by 
the more general respect and veneration showed to science in our culture. 
Following up on this legitimate worry, we analyzed the data for only those 
participants who had taken at least three philosophy courses (N = 117). Given the 
decrease in sample size and, consequently, statistical power, we didn’t expect to find all 
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the same effects in this more limited sample. Again treating MES score as our dependent 
variable, and controlling for the effect of agreement with the substantive conclusion 
drawn by the researchers, we found no effect of Question, Number or Composition.1 But 
there was a significant main effect of Method, ANCOVA, F(1, 100) = 18.9, p < .001, ηp2 
= .126. Among participants who had taken at least three philosophy courses, MES scores 
were much higher for observational method than for intuitional method, M = 5.74/4.39, 
SD = 1.51/1.94, independent samples t-test, t(115) = -4.24, p < .001, MD = 1.35. Indeed, 
preference for observation over intuitions was even greater in this group than in the entire 
sample. What’s more, if we compare MES scores for those with at least three philosophy 
courses, on the one hand, to those with zero philosophy courses, on the other, it turns out 
that the veterans hold intuitional methodology in significantly lower regard than the 
uninitiated, M = 4.39/5.04, SD = 1.94/1.86, independent samples t-test, t(437) = -2.37, p 
= .018, MD = .65, despite being no less favorable toward observational methodology, M 
= 5.74/5.99, SD = 1.51/1.39, independent samples t-test, t(471) = -1.34, p = .18, n.s. 
Additionally, in a simple regression model that uses the number of philosophy 
courses taken (0, 1, 2, 3+) to predict MES score for intuitional methodology, we find a 
small but statistically significant negative correlation: MES = 5.094 - 0.078 (Number of 
Philosophy Courses), t(833) = -2.26, p = .024, R2 = .006. By contrast, number of 
philosophy courses didn’t significantly predict MES score for observational 
methodology. Far from confirming the worry we began with, these results suggest that 
 
1 The observed power for all these comparisons was very low: (< .10). 
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greater exposure to philosophy doesn’t improve the regard in which intuitional 
methodology is held, and it may even degrade it. 
Before moving on, it’s worth noting that in the more limited sample including 
only those with 3 or more philosophy courses, we once again observed a significant 
interaction effect between participant gender and Method on MES score: Women more 
highly valued observation over intuition (M = 5.86/4.1, SD = 1.16/1.91) than men (M = 
5.65/4.5, SD = 1.74/1.96), ANCOVA, F(1, 100) = 5.1, p = .026, ηp2 = .057. 
We also analyzed the data to see whether any of the independent variables or 
participant gender affected whether participants thought the research question had 
important implications for everyday life (question 2 on the list above). There was a small 
main effect of participant gender, with women judging the questions to be more 
important than men, M = 6.44/6.29, SD = 1.60/1.64, ANOVA, F(1, 1659) = 6.42, p = 
.011, ηp2 = .004. There was a small main effect of Question, with participants viewing the 
question about selfishness as having more important implications than the question about 
knowledge, M = 6.62/6.06, SD = 1.47/1.73, ANOVA, F(1, 1659) = 50.64, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.03. There was also an interaction between Number and participant gender whereby 
women tended to view a question pursued by a team as more important than men viewed 
it (M = 6.54/6.19, SD = 1.52/1.65, independent samples t-test, t(828) = -3.10, p = .002, 
MD = .35), while women and men tended to view a question pursued by an individual no 
differently, M = 6.33/6.38, SD = 1.67/1.62, independent samples t-test, t(843) = 0.403, p 
= .687, n.s. 
3.3 Discussion 
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We found that people rated all the prototypical features associated with psychology 
(observation, team inquiry, increased presence of female researchers) higher than the 
prototypical features associated with philosophy (intuition, solitary inquiry, diminished 
presence of female researchers). We also found two interactions whereby intuition was 
viewed more favorably in the context of team inquiry than in individual inquiry and less 
favorably with greater exposure to academic philosophy. 
We also found a gender-effect whereby men tended to prefer the methodology 
characteristic of armchair philosophy more so than women, while women tended to 
prefer the methodology characteristic of experimental psychology more so than men. We 
note that experimental philosophers have previously speculated about the relationship 
between the use of intuitions and the underrepresentation of women in philosophy. For 
example, Buckwalter and Stich (2013) suggested that philosophy’s gender imbalance 
could be partly due to gender differences in intuitions about specific, central thought 
experiments. But set aside any question about gender differences over intuitions about 
specific cases. Indeed, suppose for the sake of argument that there are no such systematic 
differences that contribute to the problems facing the discipline. It could still be that men 
and women have different views about the value and relevance of inquiry driven 
primarily by appeals to intuition. Even if men and women shared all the same intuitions 
about all the important cases, women might tend to prefer the empirical methods 
associated with psychology over the intuition method associated with philosophy. 
The gender differences we observed are statistically significant but not large. We 
leave it to others to conclude how much importance to place on such real but small 
differences. Of course, participants in this study only spent a couple minutes considering 
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a single example of inquiry (see Thompson, Adleberg, Sims & Nahmias, Forthcoming, 
for subsequent research replicating and expanding our findings). Upon repeated exposure 
to similar examples of inquiry, the gender differences we observed might disappear or 
they might increase. Or perhaps they would continue at the same small but steady rate, 
resulting in gradual attrition over time and thereby contributing to the gender imbalance 
in philosophy. These are complex questions about causation that go beyond anything our 
investigation was intended address. But we think the possibilities are worth addressing 
and flag them for future research. 
4 Conclusion 
Inquiry in contemporary academic philosophy is prototypically done by individuals, 
driven by intuitions and thought experiments, and conducted mostly by males. By 
contrast, inquiry in contemporary psychology is prototypically done by teams, driven by 
observations and controlled experiments, and conducted more often by women.   
We reported two studies on the perceived value of typical inquiry in philosophy 
and experimental psychology. We found that people overwhelming associated the 
methods of thought experimentation and intuition with philosophy, they overwhelmingly 
associated controlled experimentation and observation with psychology, and they 
overwhelmingly preferred the latter (Experiment 1). More specifically, using a wide 
variety of measures and descriptions of research contexts, we found that people value 
observation over intuition, team inquiry over solitary inquiry, and a greater presence of 
females on research teams (Experiment 2). We observed this same basic pattern across a 
wide range of questions central to philosophical inquiry, such as free will, consciousness, 
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knowledge, moral relativism, fairness, and beauty. This suggests that philosophy’s 
perceived value suffers when it is associated primarily with thought experimentation and 
intuition. This could, in turn, be responsible for part of the negative perception of 
philosophy in comparison to other fields of cognitive science. 
We also found that greater prior participant exposure to philosophy (three or more 
courses) lowered one’s opinion of inquiry driven by intuitions and thought experiments 
(Experiment 2). This result is consistent with prior work surveying professional 
philosophers about the value of intuition (Kuntz and Kuntz 2011, though see also 
Buckwalter 2012). For instance, Kuntz and Kuntz found that nearly half of professional 
philosophers surveyed denied that intuitions are “useful”, and nearly three quarters 
denied that they were “essential” to justification in philosophical methods. While further 
work might track methodological trends within the discipline of philosophy itself, our 
results suggest that such preferences begin to develop upon early exposure to academic 
philosophy. 
While we have shown that people associate preferred empirical methods more 
with psychology and dispreferred non-empirical methods more with philosophy, we 
haven’t shown that people associate philosophy with only non-empirical methods. Nor 
have we shown that people don’t value any of the methods that philosophers typically 
use. For example, philosophers and psychologists both often reason carefully from prior 
knowledge to new conclusions, conduct literature reviews, and submit work for peer 
evaluation, among other things. We have chosen to focus on some main aspects of 
philosophical and psychological research that distinguish them. Future work could 
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compare the relative merits of distinctive methods used in the humanities and social 
sciences. 
We would not advise philosophers to embrace methodological changes based 
solely on public reaction. But strong preferences for more “scientific” over 
“philosophical” approaches among the general public raise several important practical 
questions. Our studies were not designed to answer these questions and we raise them 
here as worthy of further investigation. 
One question concerns enrolment in university philosophy courses. It’s reasonable 
to assume that the common perception of philosophy’s value and relevance affects 
overall student enrolment in philosophy courses, the number of philosophy majors, and 
diversity in philosophy. How might philosophers mitigate negative perceptions of how 
philosophy is done? Because of its reliance on both intuition as well as observation, 
experimentation and team-based research, we suspect that the emergence of the subfield 
of experimental philosophy can help counteract this negative perception. In fact, one 
principle motivation of experimental philosophers has been to borrow methods from 
empirical cognitive science whenever they can help answer important philosophical 
questions (see Knobe et al. 2012). Another way to help counteract this negative 
perception is through engagement with and incorporation of relevant empirical findings 
from other disciplines. To the extent that philosophical inquiry is seen as allied with such 
empirical methods and findings, it could help improve perceptions of the value and 
relevance of academic philosophy. 
Another question concerns teaching effectiveness in university philosophy 
courses. It’s also reasonable to assume that common perceptions of philosophy’s value 
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and relevance impact philosophical education and learning within the classroom. 
Philosophy instructors may be able to craft more effective teaching strategies by 
addressing the features associated with the negative impressions we have identified. 
Preferences for team-based research might also be taken into account to improve 
instruction and mentorship for undergraduate and graduate philosophy students. 
We also found that although women expressed more interest in the philosophical 
questions concerning human nature, language and knowledge, they tended to value 
typical philosophical methodology investigating these questions less than men, preferring 
instead the methodology associated with psychology and experimental cognitive science. 
Given that philosophers and psychologists address many of the same questions, it’s 
possible that methodological preferences have led more women to specialize in 
psychology over philosophy. Our studies were not designed to test this hypothesis, but 
the question merits further investigation. Yet even if this difference ultimately plays no 
role in these matters, one thing is certain: we know which of the two methods discussed 
are preferred to investigate the matter. 
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